ALFRED KORZYBSKI
SCIENCE AND SANITY
CHAPTER VI
ON SYMBOLISM
Extracts
(p. 76-82)
The
affairs of man are conducted by our own, man-made rules and according to
man-made theories. Man's achievements rest upon the use of symbols. For this
reason, we must consider ourselves as a symbolic, semantic class of life, and
those who rule the symbols, rule us. Now the term 'symbol' applies to a variety
of things, words and money included. A piece of paper, called a dollar or a
pound, has very little value if he other fellow refuses to take it; so we see
that money must be considered as a symbol for human agreement, as well as deeds
to property, stocks, bonds, . The reality behind the money-symbol is
doctrinal, 'mental', and one of the most precious characteristics of mankind.
But it must be used properly; that is, with the proper understanding of its
structure and ways of functioning. It constitutes a grave danger when misused.
When we
say 'our rulers', we mean those who are engaged in the manipulation of symbols.
There is no escape from the fact that they do, and that they always will, rule
mankind, because we constitute a symbolic class of life, and we cannot cease
from being so, except by regressing to the animal level.
The hope
for the future consists in the understanding of this fact; namely, that we
shall always be ruled by those who rule symbols, which will lead to scientific
researches in the field of symbolism and s.r.
(semantic reactions : reactions bound to the use of
words at the emotional, biological colloïdal, etc.,
levels) ). We would then demand that our rulers should be enlightened
and carefully selected. Paradoxical as it may seem, such researches as the
present work attempts, will ultimately do more for the stabilization of human
affairs than legions of policemen with machine guns, and bombs, and jails, and
asylums for the maladjusted.
A complete
list of our rulers is difficult to give; yet, a few classes of them are quite
obvious. Bankers, priests, lawyers and politicians constitute one class and
work together. They do not produce any value, but manipulate values
produced by others, and often pass signs for no values at all. Scientists and
teachers also compose a ruling class. They produce the main values mankind has,
but at present, they do not realize this. They are, in the main, themselves
ruled by the cunning methods of the first class.
In this
analysis the 'philosophers" have been omitted. This is because they
require a special treatment. As an historical fact, many 'philosophers' have
played an important and, to be frank, sinister role in history. At the bottom
of any historical trend, we find a certain 'philosophy', a structural
implication cleverly formulated by some 'philosophers' gamble on multiordinal and el (elementalist ) terms, which
have no definite single (one-valued)meaning, and so, by cleverness in twisting
, can be made to appear to mean anything desired. It is now no mystery that
some quite influential 'philosopher' were 'mentally' ill. Some 'mentally' ill
persons are tremendously clever in the manipulation of words and can sometimes
deceive even trained specialists. Among the clever concoctions which appear in
history as 'philosophic' systems, we can find flatly opposing doctrines.
Therefore, it has not been difficult at any period for the rulers to select a
cleverly constructed doctrine perfectly fitting the ends the desired.
One of the
main characteristics of such 'philosophers' is found in the delusion of
grandeur, the 'Jehovah complex'. Their problem have
appeared to them to be above criticism or assistance by other human beings, and
the correct procedure known only to super-men like themselves. So quite
naturally they have usually refused to make enquiries. They have refused even
to be informed about scientific researches carried on outside the realms of
their 'philosophy'. Because of the ignorance, they have, in the main, not even
suspected the importance of the problems of structure.
In
all fairness, it must be said that not all so-called 'philosophy' represents an
episode of semantic illness, and that a few 'philosophers' really do important
work. This applies to the so-called 'critical philosophy' and to the theory
of knowledge or epistemology. This class of workers I call epistemologists,
to avoid the disagreeable implications of the term 'philosopher'.
Unfortunately, epistemological researches are most difficult, owing mainly to
the lack of scientific psycho-logics, general semantics, and investigations of
structure and s.r. We find only a very few men
doing this work, which, in the main, is still little known and unapplied. It
must be granted that their works fo
not make easy reading. They do not command headlines; nor are they aided and
stimulated by public interest and help.
It
must be emphasized again that as long as we remain humans,
(which means a symbolic class of life), the rulers of symbols will rule
us, and that no amount of revolution will ever change this. But what mankind
has a right to ask - and the sooner the better - is that our rulers should not
be so shamelessly ignorant and, therefore, pathological in their reactions. If
a psychiatrical and scientific inquiry were to be
made upon our rulers, mankind would be appalled at the disclosures.
We have
been speaking bout 'symbols', but we have not yet discovered any general theory
concerning symbols and symbolism. Usually, we take terms lightly and never
'think' what kind of implication and s.r. one
single important term may involve. 'Symbol' is one of those important terms,
weighty in meanings. If we use the term 'food', for instance, the
presupposition is that we take for granted the existence of living beings able
to eat; and, similarly, the term 'symbol' implies the existence of intelligent
beings. The solution of the problem of symbolism, therefore, presupposes the
solution of the problem of 'intelligence' and structure. So, we see that the
issues are not only serious and difficult, but also, that we must investigate a
semantic field in which very little has been done.
In the
rough, a symbol is defined as a sign which stands for something. Any sign is
not necessarily a symbol. If it stands for something, it becomes a symbol for
this something. If it does not stand
p. 79
for something, then it becomes not a symbol but a meaningless
sign. This applies to words just as it does to bank cheques.
If one has a zero balance in the bank, but still has a cheque-book
and issues a cheque, he issues a sign but not a
symbol, because it does not stand for anything. The penalty for such use of
these particular signs as symbols is usually jailing. This analogy applies to
the oral noises we make, which occasionally become symbols and at other times
do not; as yet, no penalty is exacted for such a fraud.
Before a noise., may become a symbol, something must exist for the
symbol to symbolize. So the first problem of symbolism should be to investigate
the problem of 'existence'. To define 'existence', we have to state the
standards by which we judge existence. At present, the use of this term is not
uniform and is largely a matter of convenience. Of late, mathematicians have
discovered a great deal about this term. For our present purposes, we may
accept two kinds of existence : (1) the physical
existence, roughly connected with our 'senses' and persistence, and (2)
'logical ' existence. The new researches in the foundations of mathematics,
originated by Brouwer and Weyl,
seem to lead to a curtailment of the meaning of 'logical' existence in quite a
sound direction; but we may provisionally accept the most general meaning, as
introduced by Poincaré. He defines 'logical'
existence as a statement free from self-contradictions. Thus, we may say that a
'thought' to be a 'thought' must not be self-contradictory. A
self-contradictory statement is meaningless; we can argue either way without
reaching any valid results. We say, then, that a self- contradictory statement
has no 'logical' existence. As an example, let us take a statement about a
square circle. This is called a contradiction in terms, a non-sense, a meaningless statement, which has no 'logical' existence.
Let us label this 'word salad' by a special noise - let us say, 'blah-blah'.
Will such a noise become a word, a symbol ? Obviously
not - it stands for nothing; it remains a mere noise.,
no matter if volumes should be written about it.
It is
extremely important, semantically, to notice that not all the noises., we humans make should be considered as symbols or
valid words. Such empty noises., can occur not only in
direct 'statements', but also in 'questions'. Quite obviously, 'questions'
which employ noises., instead of words, are not
significant questions. They ask nothing, and cannot be answered. They are,
perhaps, best treated by 'mental' pathologists as symptoms of delusion,
illusion, or hallucinations. In asylums the noises.,
patients make are predominant meaningless, as far as the external world is
concerned, but become symbols in the illness of the patient.....
p. 81
An
important aspect of the problem of existence can be made clear by some
examples. Let us recall that a noise or written sign, to become a symbol, must
stand for something. Let us imagine that you, my reader, and myself are engaged in an argument. Before us, on the table,
lies something which we usually call a box of matches: you argue that there are
matches in this box; I say that there are no matches in it. Our argument can be
settled. We open the box and look, and both become convinced. It must be
noticed that in our argument we used words, because they stood for
something; so when we began to argue, the argument could be solved to our
mutual satisfaction, since there was a third factor, the object, which
corresponds to the symbol used, and this settled he
dispute. A third factor was present, and agreement became possible. Let us take
another example. Let us try to settle the problem: 'Is blah-blah a case of tra-tra ?'
Let us assume that you say 'yes', and that I say 'no'. Can we reach any agreement?
It is a real tragedy, of which life is full, that such an argument cannot be
solved at all. We used noises, not words. Here was no third factor for
which these noises stood as symbols, and so we could argue endlessly without
any possibility of agreement. That the noises may have stood for some semantic
disturbance is quite a different problem, and in such a case a psycho-pathologist
should be consulted, but arguments should stop. The reader will have no
difficulty in gathering from daily life other example many of them of highly
tragic character.
To be
followed...